Baltic Carbon Forum Vilnius – 3/4th October




ASSESSING THE GEOLOGICAL RISKS OF SUBSURFACE CO2 STORAGE

Prof. Andreas Busch (a.busch@hw.ac.uk)

Lyell Centre | Heriot-Watt University | GeoEnergy Group | https://geoenergy.hw.ac.uk/



Geological CO2 Leakage






- Define the storage complex
 - Primary/secondary seals
- Wells
 - Injection, Monitoring, Legacy?
- Matrix leakage
 - Slow, likely irrelevant
 - Geochemistry diffusioncontrolled, likely irrelevant
- • Fault leakage
 - Leakage over relevant time scales?
 - Induced seismicity
 - Temperature effects?

The Storage Complex






- Important to distinguish between *Storage Site* and *Storage Complex*, conceptually and legally
- Storage Complex more difficult to understand in terms of coupled THMC processes

Ringrose - How to Store CO2 Underground: Insights from early-mover CCS Projects, 2020


What matters and what we monitor






Saline Aquifer vs Depleted Reservoir





Pressure evolution in saline aquifers






due to CO2 injection

solubility/mineral trapping

Pressure evolution in depleted reservoirs





7






"Well he certainly does a very thorough risk analysis."

ALARP



- CO2 Leakage rates should be ALARP As Low As Reasonably Practical
- Leakage is legally defined, and rates should be zero
- Realistic? No! What are monitoring detection limits?
- What is a fraction of injected CO2 that would be tolerable to leak? 0.01%, 0.1%, 1%....?




-25 to -20	BLA	CK	NON-OPERABLE: Evacuate the zone and or area/country					
-16 to -10	RE	D	INTOLERABLE: Do not take this risk					
-9 to -5	YEL	LOW	UNDESIRABLE: Demonstrate ALARP befor proceeding					
-4 to -2	GRI	EEN	ACCEPTABLE: Proceed carefully, with continuous improvement					
-1	BL	UE	NEGLIGIBLE: Safe to proceed					
MITIGATION Control Measures		Very Unlikely	Unlikely	Medium Likelihood	Likely	Very Likely		
DEVENTION		1	2	3	4	5		
PREVENTION			LIKELIHOOD					
Light (L)	-1	SEVERITY	-1 1L	-2 21.	-3 3L	-4 4L	-5 5L	
Serious (S)	-2		-2 18	4 25	-6 38	-8 4S	-10 58	
Major (M)	-3		-3 1M	-6 2M	-9 3M	-12 4M	-15 5M	
Severe (C)	-4		4 10	-8 2C	-12 3C	-16 4C	-20 5C	
Extreme (M	C) -5		-5 1MC	-10 2MC	-15 3MC	-20 4MC	-25 5MC	



From Li and Liu, 2016 after Schlumberger


Bowtie risk assessment





Bowties - Barriers







Barriers

- Inherent / Natural
 - Feature
- Geological Properties
- Operational Strategies
- Engineering (Design, Equipment)
- > Monitoring
- Corrective Action
- Public Consultation

Geological leakage







TESLA for Clay Swelling

- <u>Example</u>: Clay swelling in CO2 stores can reactivate faults
- One of the major geological risks for the planned
 Peterhead CCS project by Shell


Passive safeguard	Argument	Evidence for argument	Evidence against argument	Outcome	TESLA classification
Mineralogy	The quantity of smectite within the storage seal may be insufficient to cause enough swelling.	None	Detailed laboratory studies on caprock samples clearly confirm the presence of significant amount of smeetite (57wt.%).	High smeetite contents proven, significant swelling strain and stress likely. Uncertainties in subsurface hydration state.	
Geometry	If not compliant with the above, clay swelling only creates a build-up in shear stresses that extends across the entire thickness of the storage seal if there is a significant discontinuity in the storage seal, c.g. a fault, with an offset comparable to the thickness of the storage seal itself.	Faults with throws of up to 33 m have been mapped in parts of this structure: The mapped caprock (U. Valhall/Rødby, lower part of the seal) thickness is greater than the maximum throws of 33 m, except if the reservoir were to extend further than currently mapped in the NE. The integrity of the upper part of the seal (Hidra/Plenus) extending across the whole storage site is good, based on analogue fields, with a total thickness in excess of possible fault offsets.	The lower part of the seal (U. Valhall/Rodby Fms) is thin enough to be offset by mapped possible faults in a limited area at the extreme NE of their possible occurrence; shear failure for this part of the storage seal would therefore be possible. The integrity of the upper part of the seal (Hidm & Plenus) is considered good, but on the basis of analogue fields only.	Threat can be excluded for entire storage seal but a low possibility remains if Rodby/U Valhall shales were the only seal; note that on the basis of hydrocarbon analogue field data the sealing properties of the overlying Hidra & Plenus are considered to be good. Uncertainties are in the North of the reservoir, where the caprock thickness decreases.	
Plasticity	If not compliant with the above, plastic deformation mechanisms in the caprock may relax the induced shear stress to prevent brittle shear type failure within the storage seal.	The higher the smectite content the softer the shale; it is therefore more likely that swelling stress generated can relax into the shale matrix, i.e. more plastic creep.	Analogue data to the Rødby/U Valhall shales are rare/lacking from literature; no direct assessment possible at this point.	This remains a topic of high uncertainty and no consistent or suitable analogue data identified. We recommend performing detailed literature and lab studies.	
Permeability	If not compliant with the above, shear type failure may not develop fault permeability.	A sufficiently large area of a fault needs to undergo shear failure in order to develop permeability along fault; even if permeability would develop, flux rates could be below the detection limits of the monitoring installations.	CO ₂ in the reservoir results in a gas column that will always exert a small overpressure (<0.5 MPa) to the caprock following hydrostatic pressure recovery. Therefore, if the fault is permeable it will leak with small but significant flux rates, based on analogue and conceptual data.	This remains a topic of high uncertainty and an R&D effort is needed to solve this issue	
Summary	If not compliant with all of the above, clay swelling will not build up a swelling pressure that is significant enough to cause shear failure of the seal. Further reservoir geometry will not allow fault reactivation and there is no permeability or pressure drive to cause CO ₂ to leak.	The geometry of the reservoir (seal thickness versus potential fault offset) does not allow shear failure for the entire seal sequence to occur. Only in the very North of the reservoir a small likelyhood remains that fault offset is comparable to the thickness of the lower part of the seal (U. Valhall/Rødby Fms).	Smectite content could be sufficient to obtain shear failure and if the fault would become permeable, the possibility for a pressure-drive for fault leakage cannot be excluded.	Clay swelling following shear failure and the development of a permeable fault remains uncertain due to many parameters that cannot be quantified. For the Goldencye reservoir, however, it is found that potential faults are below the thickness of the entire seal and a low risk remains only for the caprock. Loss of containment can therefore be classified as a low geological risk	

Summary and Conclusion



- Geological risks relate to reservoir conformance and seal containment
 - Prediction of CO2 plume migration in subsurface means understanding reservoir structure and heterogeneity
 - Prediction of leakage risks requires understanding of fault and (legacy) well location, number and condition
- Risk assessment is key in any CO2 storage project and needs to be conducted at several stages of the project, involving all subsurface disciplines and key experts

THANK YOU!



horizontal field stress

18